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Perceived procedural justice and attitudes toward litigation results have been shown to 
be mainly a result of  fair treatment by judges. The role played by attorneys has not been the 
focus of  previous research, despite the fact that they as well as judges are theoretically key legal 
specialists. Judges in civil justice case are thought to regulate litigants’ actions, including vetoes 
and excessive demands, to ensure that conflicts do not become deadlocked. At the same time, 
litigants need attorneys to control the litigation process. In this study, two sets of  survey data 
were combined and analyzed to investigate the effects of  attorneys on litigation. The results 
confirm that a favorable image of  attorneys leads to a more positive evaluation of  judges, 
promotes the perception of  process control, and restrains relative deprivation, suggesting that 
litigants assess attorneys on the basis of  whether they provide adequate technical information 
for engaging in litigation.
Key words:  attorney, legal procedures, process control, relative deprivation, procedural 
justice
Previous research has confirmed that the attitudes of  parties concerned in public decisions 
are influenced by authority figures. In particular, it is known that litigants who perceive that 
they are fairly treated by judges in legal situations are more likely to feel procedural justice 
and to accept the results. Judges play a major role in determining the attitude of  litigants. 
However, to our knowledge, the role of  attorneys, which is essential in the legal system and 
an important interpersonal element in litigation, has not been studied in procedural justice 
research. Therefore, the aim of  the present study was to examine the cognitive effects that 
attorneys have on litigants.
Process control and acceptance
Generally speaking, nobody likes lawsuits. However, people come to court when they 
cannot settle conflicts by themselves. Indeed, previous research on Japanese people who have 
taken cases to court shows that more than 90% of  plaintiffs felt that litigation was only the 
way to resolve their dispute (Society for the Study of  the Civil Procedural System, 2014). The 
reason disputants are unable to settle their conflicts outside of  the court is because they often 
set high goals and tend not to compromise on their own, which can easily lead to deadlock.
Thibaut and Walker (1975) provided a theoretical explanation of  legal proceedings from 
a social psychology point of  view. According to their research, disputants contending with 
others are often unable to settle their conflicts because they can control the decisions; they can 
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freely assert and reject their opponents’ suggestions if  they do not consider them adequate. 
Therefore, their control must be transferred to a third party to reduce excessive demands and 
reach an agreement.
However, disputants who hand over control to third parties do not want to lose control 
completely; they want to maximize the results of  the legal proceedings by presenting their own 
evidence and arguments. Thibaut and Walker (1975) conducted an experiment to ascertain 
the preferences of  disputants. In their experiment, the participants perceived third-party 
control most strongly in autocratic procedures, followed by arbitration, moot, mediation, 
and bargaining. By contrast, the participants had the most favorable view of  arbitration, 
followed by moot, mediation, autocratic procedures, and bargaining. This result suggests that 
disputants prefer moderate third-party control. Thibaut and Walker (1975) conducted another 
experiment to identify which legal procedures were preferred by disputants. They found that 
disputants were more satisfied with verdicts achieved through adversarial procedures and 
perceived them to be fairer when they had been able to present their own evidence and speak 
freely. On the other hand, verdicts achieved through inquisitorial procedures, in which the 
disputants were unable to present evidence freely, were perceived as less fair. These findings 
indicate that disputants want to maintain as much control as possible.
Thibaut and Walker (1975) divided the control-in-decision-making process into two 
categories: 1) decision control, which is the direct influence over a decision, such as a veto; and 2) 
process control, which is the influence of  processes such as communication or the presentation 
of  evidence. Process control is needed to influence decisions indirectly. In a bargaining 
situation, because both disputants have decision control, they are sometimes unable to settle 
their conflict. In such cases, they may hand over decision control to a third party, who can 
restrain them and help them reach an agreement. However, because both parties hope to get 
as favorable a result as possible, they both try to retain process control.
What is the role of  the attorney?
Thibaut and Walker (1975) presented several experiments confirming that litigants were 
more likely to perceive procedural justice and accept the results in adversarial compared with 
other procedures because of  process control. Based on a real adversarial procedure, that used 
in the experiment conducted by Thibaut and Walker (1975) contained attorneys on the side of  
each litigant. Therefore, the litigants were thought to need support from attorneys to secure 
process control in an adversarial procedure effectively.
Considering actual Japanese civil actions, most disputants seem to entrust their cases to 
attorneys because untrained individuals tend to find civil law and the code of  civil procedure 
excessively complicated. Attorneys must submit required papers and evidence, develop 
claims, and argue with opposing parties and their attorneys on behalf  of  litigants. Given that 
attorneys play this key role, disputants are assumed to want them to utilize their expertise 
by demonstrating effective process control to achieve favorable results. Actually, Ishida (2010) 
confirmed that litigants appreciate attorneys for the following three reasons: adequately 
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preparing for a lawsuit, providing rapid legal services, and giving a detailed explanation of  the 
results.
Nevertheless, Imazai (2010) has confirmed that this very positive evaluation of  attorneys 
is not effective for the disputants’ evaluations of  the subjective validity of  the final decision. 
Some studies have shown that disputants’ sense of  control and impressions of  the judges affect 
their attitudes toward the final decision, including acceptance, perceived procedural fairness, 
the suppression of  deprivation, and satisfaction with the decision (Imazai, 2013; Imazai 
& Imazai, 2010; Ohbuchi, Sugawara, Teshigahara, & Imazai, 2005; Sugawara, Imazai, & 
Ohbuchi, 1999). These effects are considered robust in legal situations.
However, the presence of  attorneys appears to affect the disputants’ attitudes toward 
the results indirectly through their own control or perception of  the judges. As Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients are approximately 0.50 between both attorneys and judges and 
attorneys and litigants’ control, Imazai (2010) has shown that attorney evaluations are 
associated with litigants’ perceptions of  judges and their own self-control. This result suggests 
that attorney evaluations might not be a major factor in disputants’ views of  decisions 
because attorneys are not responsible for judgments, but litigants could feel that the actions of  
attorneys enable disputants to present their claims and evidence to judges more effectively.
Limited self-interest
Thibaut and Walker’s theory is referred to as the “self-interest model” (Lind & Tyler, 
1988), even though people are not necessarily motivated to maximize unlimited gains at all 
times. It has been shown that people feel unsatisfied when they see their condition as relatively 
worse than that of  others—a phenomenon known as “relative deprivation” (Crosby, 1982; 
Major, 1994; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). People feel relative 
deprivation when they compare their present state with their own better past experiences 
or with other people in a better situation (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). Such 
perceptions become factors that make people imagine better potential results in counterfactual 
situations. Some researchers have focused not only on time periods or other people, but also on 
the concept of  “deservedness.” Ambrose, Harland, and Kulik (1991) and Folger (1986, 1987) 
carried out experiments confirming that people tend to resent unfavorable results that are 
given in an unjustifiable situation without any explanation.
In the case of  civil actions, few litigants try to gain unlimited profit; in most cases, the 
plaintiff  simply aims to recover a loss, while the defendant wants to keep the amount of  
compensation they have to pay as low as possible. The closer the results to these imagined 
criteria, the more satisfied the litigants will be. Of  course, litigants sometimes change the 
level of  imagined results that they feel appropriate as they are not always confident of  being 
able to estimate the level correctly. In such situations, attorneys can provide litigants with 
information about valid results or the fairness of  the litigation proceedings; this information 
can help to shape their clients’ attitudes toward the results.
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Hypothetical model of  litigant’s cognitive process
As mentioned above, when litigants perceive process control, they are more likely to accept 
the results of  litigation. This study presents a model of  the cognitive process of  litigants (see 
Figure 1). First, litigants who cannot settle conflicts on their own want a judge to act as a third 
party to restrain their unproductive actions while simultaneously allowing them to control 
some aspects of  the process. Litigants who view their judges in a positive light are therefore 
more likely to perceive process control.
Hypothesis 1. Positive evaluation of  judges promotes perceived process control.
Second, Thibaut and Walker (1975) argued that litigants who are given an opportunity to 
control the process are more likely to perceive justice and accept the results.
Hypothesis 2.  Perceived process control promotes perceived procedural justice and 
acceptance of  results.
Third, the present model examines two results-related variables: acceptance of  results and 
relative deprivation. Most litigants are motivated to maximize their outcome within the range 
of  valid rights, and dissatisfied when they imagine they could have gained a better outcome 
than they actually did. For these reasons, litigants who do not feel relative deprivation of  
outcome are more likely to accept the results. If  litigants imagine better results with less 
controllable or fairer procedures, they will feel deprivation.
Hypothesis 3. Process control and procedural justice restrain relative deprivation.
Hypothesis 4. Restraint of  relative deprivation promotes acceptance of  results.
The present study also explores the informational effects associated with attorneys. 
As previously mentioned, it has been shown that attorneys have less impact on perceived 
justice and acceptance than do judges (Imazai, 2010). However, attorneys are responsible for 
explaining the actions of  judges, the extent to which litigants can control procedures, and 
what constitutes reasonable results. Litigants who retain attorneys use the supportive and 
technical information provided by their attorneys to evaluate each aspect of  the process. The 
broken lines in Figure 1 illustrate that litigants’ impressions of  their attorneys can be assumed 
to influence their evaluations of  judges and perceived process control.
Hypothesis 5.  Attorney evaluations promote perceived procedural justice and acceptance of  
results via evaluations of  judges and perceived process control.
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Figure 1. Hypothetical model of  the attorney’s effects on the litigant’s attitude
Methods
Procedure and respondents
In the present study, two data sets were joined. The first data set was originally collected 
for a report on Japan’s civil litigation survey (Society for the Study of  the Civil Procedural 
System, 2014). That research aimed to produce fundamental data for use in designing a civil 
litigation system. The report investigated individuals who had been involved in litigation and 
already finished their first trial. To extract targeted persons, researchers carried out two-stage, 
unstratified probability-proportional-to-size sampling. District courts were elected repeatedly 
by 300 lots and allocated a population number, which was the number of  hits multiplied by 20. 
Of  the 6,000 people contacted, 2,406 consented to receive a questionnaire, and 770 responded. 
The questionnaire asked each participant about the sort of  case he or she was involved in, 
the disputed amount, time period, conflict process, motivation, court procedures, his or her 
impressions of  the judge and attorneys, his or her assessment of  the results, and his or her 
evaluation of  the Japanese legal system overall. The survey was carried out between August 
and November 2011. These data were deposited in the Center for Social Research and the Data 
Archives of  The University of  Tokyo’s Institute of  Social Science for all researchers to use.
The second data set was gathered by the same research group between August and 
November 2016 (Society for the Study of  the Civil Procedural System, 2018). It included the 
same questions and was collected using the same procedures; in this case, 5,000 people were 
contacted, of  whom, 3,146 agreed to receive the questionnaire, and 910 responded.
Multivariate analysis of  variance was used to compare six variables (these are detailed 
later). Although the mean difference in relative deprivation between the two data sets was 
significant (2011: 2.51; 2016: 2.68; F (1, 1164) = 7.89; p = .005), the Box’s M statistic (23.298) 
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was not (p = .335); therefore, it was considered practical to combine the two data sets.
After merging the two data sets, they were checked for inconsistent answers; as 43 
respondents answered questions about their impressions of  attorneys without having retained 
an attorney, these responses were excluded from analysis. Therefore, the final number of  cases 
analyzed was 1,637, of  whom, 1,325 had retained attorneys and 312 had not.  Following path 
analysis used the 1,325 respondents who retained attorneys.
Scales and questions
The scales used in the present study are presented in Table 1: evaluation of  the attorney, 
evaluation of  the judge, process control, relative deprivation, and acceptance of  results. All 
questions were answered using a five-point scale ranging from “not at all” (1) to “completely” (5).
Evaluation of the attorney. The attorney evaluation scale was composed of  18 
questions about the attorney’s job performance relating to his or her attitude toward litigants, 
support of  litigants, and ability to explain the litigation process (Cronbach’s α = .98). Another 
question in the original questionnaire asking whether the attorney was domineering was 
excluded because it reduced the α-value.
Evaluation of the judge. The judge evaluation scale was composed of  13 questions 
about the judge’s job performance and attitude toward litigants (Cronbach’s α = .96). As in the 
case of  attorneys, the question about domineering behavior was excluded.
Perceived process control. The process control scale was composed of  three questions 
about the extent to which respondents participated in the procedure (Cronbach’s α = .81).
Perceived procedural justice. Only one direct question was asked about perceived 
procedural justice.
Relative deprivation. The relative deprivation scale was composed of  four questions 
probing whether the respondents felt that they could have obtained a more favorable outcome 
if  they had faced trial in other way (Cronbach’s α = .87).
Acceptance of results. The acceptance scale was composed of  five questions 
ascertaining the extent to which respondents complied with the outcome and considered it 
valid (Cronbach’s α = .97).
Results
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations for each variable. The 
mean values of  the two groups (those who retained attorneys and those who did not) are 
shown separately. A comparison of  the mean values of  these two groups confirms that the 
respondents with attorneys gave the judge a higher rating (F (1, 1563) = 18.93; p = .00) and 
perceived higher levels of  process control (F (1, 1550) = 4.18; p = .041) than did respondents 
without. The correlation value was calculated using the data from the group with attorneys.
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Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations for each variable
Mean (SD)
2 3 4 5 6
Not retained Retained
1 Attorney ---- 4.17 (0.89) .32** .45** .36** -.53** .46**
2 Judge 3.91 (1.33) 4.30 (1.37)** .58** .70** -.37** .54**
3 Process control 3.75 (1.38) 3.91 (1.18)* .59** -.46** .52**
4 Procedural justice 3.88 (1.58) 3.89 (1.57)  -.40** .57**
5 Relative deprivation 2.61 (1.13) 2.59 (1.07) -.62**
6 Acceptance 3.31 (1.40) 3.33 (1.38)
* p <.05, ** p < .01
As unexpected relationships were possible, a saturated model was analyzed using a path 
analysis (Amos 22) to confirm the way that antecedent variables were assumed to influence 
not only specific variables in the theoretical model, but also all subsequent variables directly 
(χ2 (0, 21) = 157.338; p = .000; CFI = 1.00). This analysis revealed that the coefficient between 
evaluation of  the judge and relative deprivation was not significant (standardized β = –.07; 
p = .051); therefore, this was removed from the model. When the modified path model was 
analyzed, the fit indices showed sufficient value (χ2 (1, 21) = 3.839; p = .050; CFI = .999; 
RMSEA= .046). Figure 2 shows the following: a positive evaluation of  the judge promoted 
perceived process control and procedural justice; perceived process control promoted perceived 
procedural justice, slightly promoted acceptance of  results and reduced relative deprivation; 
perceived procedural justice restrained relative deprivation and promoted acceptance 
of  results; and relative deprivation diminished acceptance of  results. Table 2 shows the 
standardized coefficients between the mediated and direct effects using Amos. Looking at 
the coefficients regarding Hypothesis 5, evaluation of  attorney was confirmed to promote 
perceived procedural justice and acceptance of  results more indirectly than directly.
Figure 2. Results of  the analysis using Amos
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Table 2 Comparison of  mediated and direct effects
Evaluation of 
attorney
Evaluation of  judge
Perceived process
control
Perceived procedural
justice
Direct Mediated Direct Mediated Direct Mediated Direct Mediated
Perceived process control .29 .16
Perceived procedural justice .08 .29 .53 .12
Relative deprivation - .39 - .14 .00 - .19 - .21 - .03
Acceptance of  result .08 .38 .18 .25 .08 .15 .22 .05
Discussion
The results of  the present study reveal the basic cognitive process of  litigants. As a 
positive evaluation of  the judge has been shown to influence perceived procedural justice, 
process control, and acceptance of  results, the image of  the judge can be assumed to be closely 
associated with the litigation process. Especially, the result that a positive image of  the judge 
promoted the litigant’s sense of  control supports Hypothesis 1, in which litigants evaluate 
judges from the viewpoint of  process control. Moreover, a positive evaluation of  the judge also 
affected procedural justice and acceptance of  results, suggesting that litigants form their final 
attitudes of  litigation based widely on their perception of  the judge. In addition, perceived 
process control was shown to promote perceived procedural justice and simultaneously to 
restrain relative deprivation. These results suggest that sufficient process control, including the 
ability to make assertions and present evidence, makes people perceive procedural justice and 
feel that they have gained the best possible outcome. However, perceived process control was 
not found to have a strong effect on acceptance of  results. Therefore, Hypothesis 2, in which 
perceived process control promotes both procedural justice and acceptance of  results, was 
partially supported; however, process control was confirmed to affect acceptance of  results 
more indirectly than directly. As perceived process control was confirmed to be more strongly 
associated with relative deprivation than with acceptance of  results, process control would not 
affect the litigant’s final attitude directly, but would give them the image of  an unchangeable 
result. Third, since relative deprivation has been shown to inhibit acceptance of  results and 
to be restrained by both process control and procedural justice, Hypotheses 3 and 4 were 
supported. In other words, the harder it is for a litigant to imagine that the result could have 
been better, the easier it is to persuade the litigant that the result was appropriate because 
of  the process. Furthermore, procedural justice was found to promote acceptance of  results 
directly. As insisted by Lind and Tyler (1988), procedural justice itself  is a value for socialized 
people who have come to obey their social system; thus, procedural justice would not only 
persuade litigants that there is no possibility to gain a better result, but also change their 
attitudes directly.
In addition to revealing the litigants’ basic cognitive processes, this study also revealed 
how they are influenced by attorneys. A positive evaluation of  the attorney has been shown to 
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promote a positive evaluation of  the judge and perceived process control, and to reduce relative 
deprivation, moreover, its limited effects on perceived procedural justice and acceptance of  
results. This finding implies that the attorneys do not influence assessments in the later stages 
of  the cognitive process, such as the results or procedural justice. However, since its mediated 
effect was confirmed, attorneys would influence procedural justice and acceptance of  results 
indirectly; these results could be thought to support Hypothesis 5. Attorneys could influence 
litigants’ final attitudes indirectly by sharing technical details, explaining how judges make 
decisions, telling litigants how to behave during litigation, and discussing reasonable outcomes. 
Considering the comparison of  means in the present study, it is clear that litigants who have 
retained attorneys have more appreciation for their judges and process control than those who 
have not because attorneys indirectly help them feel more satisfied with the litigation process.
Furthermore, even though it was not discussed theoretically in the present study, the 
effects of  a positive evaluation of  the judge on perceived procedural justice were clearly 
confirmed. Some studies have noted a connection between authority and procedural justice (e.g., 
Barling & Phillips, 1992; Bies & Moag, 1986; Moorman, 1991; Shapiro & Brett, 1993; Tyler & 
Lind, 1992). Imazai (2016) reviewed studies that analyzed the effect of  authority (Ambrose & 
Schminke, 2001; Colquitt, Greenberg, & Scott, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2003) and confirmed that 
disputants who are interested in the conflicts strongly are much more likely to receive adequate 
explanations from judges, and find it easier to perceive procedural justice. Considering that 
attorneys affect the perception of  judges, such explanations from judges could be considered 
effective if  attorneys help their litigants fully understand them.
Based on the above results, attorneys can be considered to have an informational 
support function that differs from the role of  judges, who must manage the litigation and 
make decisions from a neutral standpoint. The mean attorney evaluation was relatively high 
(positive), suggesting that most litigants trust their attorneys to be “on their side.” They 
ask their attorneys how they should act to control the process, how to make valid assertions, 
and how to reach a common “point of  compromise.” By explaining the process of  litigation, 
attorneys help litigants understand the intention or vision of  judges more easily. Attorneys’ 
informational support therefore makes litigants more likely to consent to the results indirectly, 
in contrast to a judge’s actions, which directly influence perceived procedural justice and 
acceptance of  results. For these reasons, attorneys have the effect of  improving the quality of  
litigation for litigants subjectively.
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Appendix Scales and questions used in the present study
Evaluation of  the attorney
Do you think that your attorney...
Tried to ensure that the litigation process progressed in the appropriate way?
Tried to ensure that the litigation process progressed speedily?
Spent enough time listening to your side of  the story?
Dedicated himself  or herself  to representing you?
Was a trustworthy person?
Had a good understanding of  your approach and values, apart from your opinion of  
his or her interpretation of  the law?
Was polite to you?
Had sufficient knowledge to represent you, even in areas other than the law?
Had properly prepared to represent you?
Had a thorough understanding of  all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
case?
Adequately explained the prospects for expediting the litigation process?
Adequately explained the factual and legal issues in the case?
Explained the judgment or settlement details in a way you could understand?
Adequately communicated your arguments and evidence to the judge?
Had adequate trial skills, including in negotiation and witness examination?
Considered resolutions that would be good for all parties involved, including the other 
side?
Had an outstanding level of  legal expertise?
Paid adequate attention to your views on progressing the proceedings or resolving the 
case?
Evaluation of  the judge
The judge spoke in a way that was easy to understand.
The judge fully understood the points at issue.
The judge asked enough questions to fully understand the issue.
 The judge gave sufficient instructions, including what materials to prepare by the next 
hearing date.
Do you think that the judge...
Considered the litigation process from a neutral standpoint?
Listened to your side of  the story?
Was a trustworthy person?
Had a good understanding of  your approach and values, apart from your opinion of  
his or her interpretation of  the law?
Was polite to you?
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Had a good understanding of  your approach and values, apart from your opinion of  
his or her interpretation of  the law?
Had prepared adequately to try the case?
Had an outstanding level of  legal expertise?
Had a thorough understanding of  all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
case?
Perceived process control
You were able to make the case for your side fully during the hearings.
You were able to present the evidence for your side fully during the hearings.
The entire litigation process was easy to understand.
Perceived procedural justice
Only one direct question was asked about perceived procedural justice.
Relative deprivation
You could have obtained a more favorable outcome if  you had had a different attorney. 
Alternatively, if  you did not have an attorney, you might have obtained a more favorable 
outcome if  you had had an attorney.
You might have been able to obtain a more favorable outcome if  you had known more 
about how to argue your case.
You might have been able to obtain a more favorable outcome if  you had known more 
about the law and the litigation system.
Acceptance of  results
The outcome of  the litigation process was fair.
The litigation process was consistent with your approach and values, setting aside your 
opinion of  the law.
The outcome of  the litigation process was consistent with legislative provisions.
You were able to accept the outcome of  the litigation process.
The outcome of  the litigation process made sense to you.
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